Debating Concepts displays the values and editorial ethos of the African Arguments book series, publishing engaged, typically radical, scholarship, unique and activist writing from inside the African continent and past. It affords debates and engagements, contexts and controversies, and evaluations and responses flowing from the African Arguments books. It’s edited and managed by the Worldwide African Institute, hosted at SOAS College of London, the homeowners of the e-book sequence of the identical title.
Regional relations within the Horn of Africa had been thrown into turmoil in 2024 after Ethiopia and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 1 January, associated to the granting of landlocked Ethiopia entry to ports and land for a naval base on Somaliland’s coast in exchange for a stake in an Ethiopian state-owned asset (possibly Ethiopian Airlines) and the prospect of formal recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty. The federal authorities of Somalia in Mogadishu (which doesn’t settle for Somaliland’s independence) has forcefully condemned the MoU, which has additionally elicited expressions of concern from neighbouring countries.
Nevertheless, this isn’t the primary settlement between Ethiopia and Somaliland which has by-passed the Somali government in Mogadishu. Certainly, such cooperation goes again greater than twenty years. Nonetheless, the size of the Somali and worldwide response is extra intense on this case. There are some essential, if refined, shifts in regional dynamics which have factored into the present diplomatic turmoil.
Particularly, Ethiopia has taken a extra assertive stance on business and navy entry to the ocean since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018. With this MoU, Ethiopia’s quest for sea entry has now intersected and infected with the long-unresolved query of Somaliland’s standing, which has been rising steadily extra acute within the decade since Somalia’s federal authorities was internationally acknowledged in 2012. A number of rounds of talks between Mogadishu and Hargeisa have made little progress, with the last talks held only days before the MoU was signed.
Symbolic signing ceremony backfires
Little concrete element was introduced on the signing ceremony (and important uncertainty stays) in regards to the contents of the MoU, which was not made public. Nevertheless, Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi Abdi’s agency assertion – on the signing ceremony and in subsequent statements – that Ethiopia would formally acknowledge Somaliland’s sovereignty has touched off a diplomatic firestorm. The Somali authorities in Mogadishu has handed a legislation nullifying the MoU. Ethiopia has confused that negotiations are continuing on a final agreement.
Neighbouring nations, donors and regional our bodies together with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), and the League of Arab States (LAS) have issued expressions of concern, and known as for the respect of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The UN Safety Council held a closed discussion on the situation on 29 January. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has visited quite a few regional capitals, together with Asmara and Cairo, fuelling hypothesis – in all probability overstated – of an Eritrea-Egypt-Somalia alliance to problem Ethiopia’s actions.
Ethiopia’s attempts to clarify that it has agreed solely to “provisions for the Ethiopian authorities to conduct an in-depth evaluation in the direction of taking a place concerning the efforts of Somaliland to realize recognition” have executed little to assuage its critics. Nationalist rhetoric from Somali and Somalilander officers and pundits has intensified by way of diplomatic channels, and particularly in conventional media and on social media platforms. The prospect of an Ethiopian naval base on Somali(land) territory, in addition to the general query of respect for Somali sovereignty, are the core points for many critics, including some within Somaliland.
Ethiopia’s port dependence drawback
Opinion throughout a variety of the political spectrum in Ethiopia appears to be broadly in favour of the MoU, because the query of sea entry connects to a variety of long-standing economic and especially nationalist debates which have rumbled on for the reason that nation misplaced entry to neighbouring Eritrea’s ports throughout their 1998-2000 battle. Eritrea’s independence in 1993 (1991 de facto) left Ethiopia landlocked, and resulted within the elimination of Ethiopia’s navy, an underdeveloped however status linked capability which had been primarily based within the Eritrean port of Asab.
The lack of Eritrea’s ports compelled Ethiopia to shift its commerce to Djibouti, which has seen major upgrades to its capacity in the last 20 years. That stated, Ethiopian issues about its dependence on Djibouti are longstanding. Berbera port in Somaliland has lengthy been a big port for commerce linked to Ethiopia, with a well-developed cross border livestock commerce community going again into the nineteenth century and earlier.
In the course of the previous 20 years, there was a concerted push by governments in Addis Ababa and Hargeisa to spice up Ethiopian commerce by way of Berbera, most just lately with a proper settlement in 2018 involving Ethiopia, Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates, which by its state-affiliated Dubai Ports (DP) World has carried out a major upgrade to Berbera’s facilities. Nevertheless, the depth of response to that settlement was considerably totally different, as explored under.
Upending sensitivity round sovereignty
Whereas Bihi could have overstated the diploma to which the settlement represented a step in the direction of formal Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty, his assertion to that impact has underlined each how rather more acute the query of Somaliland’s future vis-à-vis Somalia has turn out to be for the reason that DP World deal was signed in 2018.
It’s value noting that if there’s a area that’s the exception to the post-1945 worldwide and particularly Organisation of African Unity/African Union rule of “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states”, it’s the Horn of Africa, the place each Eritrea and South Sudan have turn out to be impartial states within the final thirty years.
That stated, regional and worldwide diplomatic positioning has been constructed on the premise that consensus on Somaliland’s final standing would begin from a negotiated settlement between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. In 2012, when the Somali Federal Authorities in Mogadishu was internationally acknowledged because the official sovereign authorities of Somalia, the prospect of such a consensus elevated considerably.
Somaliland, whereas unrecognized since 1991, has however been in a position to pursue its personal agenda, benefiting from relative stability in contrast with Southern-Central Somalia, in addition to the anomaly of its diplomatic place earlier than there was a acknowledged authorities in Mogadishu with which to achieve a proper settlement.
Since 2012, nonetheless, the urgency of a decision of the state of affairs has elevated, significantly because the federal authorities in Mogadishu has taken again formal management over elements of Somalia’s sovereignty, similar to management over Somali airspace, and as elements of the federal constitutional system have been formalized, elevating the prospect of Somaliland functioning as a federal member state. Somalia has additionally just lately achieved substantial debt reduction, and seen a decades-old UN arms embargo lifted.
Somaliland’s clans are already represented in Somalia’s federal parliament by way of the oblique “electoral” mechanism whereby MPs are allotted by the participation of clan elders alongside the so-called “4.5 formula” – underscoring an underappreciated dimension of Somali interconnectivity, and illustrating the political and financial alternatives related to Somaliland’s ambiguous present standing, as people with connections in both system can pursue their pursuits throughout jurisdictions.
Somaliland in the meantime has its personal structure, electoral system, central financial institution, foreign money and passports, albeit with some monetary intermediation by way of the Gulf States and Djibouti, to hook up with world monetary structure.
Tensions have intensified because the prospect of a everlasting decision to the query of Somaliland’s standing has drawn nearer. Particularly, battle has damaged out within the final yr, within the area around Las Anod, which was claimed by Somaliland as a part of its territory however can be the seat of an aspiring Somali Federal Member state, between native forces and the Somaliland military. This has escalated hostilities between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, and fostered tensions inside Somaliland itself, the place presidential and parliamentary elections have been delayed – increasing questions about Bihi’s domestic legitimacy.
President Hassan additionally faces complicated political dynamics in Somalia, together with relations with Federal member states, a stalled offensive in opposition to the Al-Shabaab insurgency which nonetheless controls elements of the Somali hinterlands, and a push for reforms to the 2012 provisional constitution, which restarted in parliament in January amid the MoU controversy.
These intra- and inter-Somali dynamics have helped to drive Bihi in the direction of signing the MoU, and fed into the tensions underlying the response from Somalis – in each Somaliland and Somalia.
Abiy’s aspirations for Ethiopia’s regional safety affect
Though the ultimate settlement is but to be finalized, what has emerged for the reason that MoU was signed strongly means that Ethiopia will proceed to make use of Berbera for commerce. The important thing distinction seems to be the possible 50-year lease of land (reportedly 20 km2 on the coast close to Lughaya) that Ethiopia might use to develop naval facility. This might be a big growth, each when it comes to Ethiopia’s relationship with Somaliland, and when it comes to Ethiopia’s skill to undertaking its affect on safety and financial dynamics within the Horn of Africa and past inside the wider Crimson Sea area, a key hall for world commerce.
For Ethiopia, the MoU represents Abiy’s newest pivot since he got here to energy in 2018, however could trigger extra hassle than he anticipated. Abiy’s first pivot was to Eritrea, so as to push again in opposition to and isolate the Tigray Folks’s Liberation Entrance (TPLF) inside the Ethiopian political and safety enviornment.
This alliance noticed relations normalized in 2018 after nearly twenty years of “no battle, no peace” stalemate, however in the end helped to precipitate the 2020-22 battle with the TPLF, which had held the steadiness of energy inside Ethiopia’s ruling political coalition from 1991-2018, and which had refused to affix Abiy’s merger of the former coalition parties into the Prosperity Party in late 2019.
Abiy’s second pivot concerned an embrace of diasporan Ethiopians, particularly these aligned with an rising Amhara nationalism, which escalated and militarized sharply through the battle in Tigray and northern Ethiopia. Because the November 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Settlement with the Tigrayan management, Abiy’s authorities has faced increasing tensions with the Amhara region, significantly across the makes an attempt to pressure demobilization of Fano fighters and different regional militia, in addition to souring relations with Eritrea, which had wished to see the TPLF eradicated as a political pressure in Ethiopia.
This has compounded continued instability within the Oromia region, which predated Abiy’s rise to power, in addition to macroeconomic pressures exacerbated by Covid-19 and the battle – significantly international trade shortages, steadiness of funds pressures and exterior debt pressures, which noticed Ethiopia default on its Eurobond in late December 2023.
Amid these rising pressures, Abiy in mid-2023 began a brand new pivot in the direction of the “Crimson Sea” and the question of Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea. (However that the MoU pertains to the Gulf of Aden shoreline.)
The Abiy administration is critical about restoring Ethiopian naval presence within the Crimson Sea, Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. Makes an attempt to usher in new navy cooperation began in 2018, together with reaching an settlement for French support for naval and other military enhancement. The Tigray battle strained safety cooperation with Ethiopia’s Western companions, however help from Turkey and the United Arab Emirates has grown. Ethiopia’s membership in the BRICS group of nations also needs to be understood on this mild.
Berbera’s position in Ethiopia’s port diversification efforts
Port diversification has additionally been an essential purpose. Ethiopia’s pursuits in boosting commerce volumes by Somaliland’s port at Berbera considerably pre-date the Abiy administration. The Ethiopian authorities’s five-year financial Progress and Transformation Plan I (2010-15) and II (2015-20) every embrace a goal of 30% of general commerce utilizing Berbera port.
Port Sudan has additionally been a goal for Ethiopian commerce, significantly agricultural commodities from Ethiopia’s northwest. Nevertheless, insecurity in Sudan throughout 2023, and earlier than that escalating tensions through the 2020-22 battle over the disputed Fashaga border area, have undermined the utility of Sudan’s port from the angle of Addis Ababa.
Donors (significantly the UK) supported negotiations involving Ethiopia’s and Somaliland’s authorities to reinforce the so-called “Berbera hall” nearly a decade in the past, together with main funding within the highway infrastructure and on the port in Berbera itself. Ethiopia’s highway community was considerably upgraded to the border space round Tog-Wajale by the mid-2010s.
Progress on the contract tender was gradual and painstaking, with Ethiopia’s earlier led authorities favouring French multinational Bollore, which had expertise in multimodal transportation infrastructure. Nevertheless, the donor-supported tendering course of was deserted by the earlier Somaliland authorities underneath President Mohamed Silanyo, which awarded a $442m port concession to the Emirati state-backed DP World in 2016, in addition to a contract to improve the highway from Berbera to the Ethiopian border.
Nonetheless, Ethiopia was not not noted of that deal. The terms of the eventual agreement included the choice for Ethiopia to train a 19% stake within the concession undertaking, together with the Somaliland authorities (30%) and DP World (51%). By mid-2022 nonetheless, Ethiopia had failed to take up its stake, which was absorbed by DP World and Somaliland.
You will need to notice that Somaliland’s settlement with the UAE additionally initially included plans for a military facility alongside the commercial port at Berbera, however this side of the settlement was subsequently dropped. The withdrawal of the Emirati navy facility could partly clarify the distinction within the scale of the response from Mogadishu in 2024 in comparison with 2018.
In 2018, Abiy visited Mogadishu after the Berbera port deal was signed for talks with then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, even asserting plans for Ethio-Somali cooperation on four (unspecified) port projects. Nonetheless, Farmajo did leverage tensions over the Berbera port deal to strengthen his place in parliament, and broke off ties with UAE. Relations had been restored underneath President Hassan from 2022.
What now?
We must always perceive the MoU with Somaliland on this context. It displays each continuity of a long-standing Ethiopian agenda to develop various commerce routes to Djibouti, in addition to Abiy’s imaginative and prescient of Ethiopia as a regional safety actor past the Horn of Africa and into the Crimson Sea and Western Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, growing Somalia-Somaliland tensions imply that Abiy could not be capable to clean issues over as simply in 2024 as he was in a position to in 2018.
From what we all know of the MoU, Ethiopia will proceed to route business commerce by way of Berbera. The prospect of an Ethiopian naval base round Lughaya would presumably be much like the agreements neighbouring Djibouti has reached with varied states for bases, together with the USA, Japan, China and France – and as such, will not be an unimaginable prospect for a Somali state alongside the identical mannequin Djibouti is.
It is usually essential to notice that building of such a base is a medium-term prospect at greatest: the services would must be constructed from scratch, and it’s not clear how Ethiopia would finance this, or when naval sources could be sufficiently developed for deployment at any new facility. Slightly, the worth appears to be in signalling the seriousness of Ethiopia’s intentions – and probably to press the case that talks with Eritrea ought to resume about Asab, although this also carries significant risks.
Mogadishu is now in a stronger place to claim its agenda vis-à-vis Somaliland’s final standing, and in response to Ethiopia’s actions. For instance, Mogadishu used its management of Somali airspace to turn back an Ethiopian flight to Hargeisa on 17 January. This can have emboldened the federal authorities to take a troublesome place on the draft MoU and when it comes to pushing again in opposition to Ethiopia’s agenda for a naval base.
Nevertheless, mutual safety entanglements – significantly Ethiopia’s contributions to the African peacekeeping mission in Somalia, in addition to its personal bilateral navy deployments in central Somalia, each supporting the event of Somalia’s nationwide military and combatting Al-Shabaab – imply that formal dialogue is more likely to resume between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. Bureaucratic dialogue has already restarted.
Nonetheless, Abiy’s administration has established an method to international coverage, each within the area and past, that challenges established patterns of Ethiopian diplomacy and has wrongfooted a few of its conventional companions, significantly within the West. This may be anticipated to proceed. For Ethiopia’s Western donors particularly, it’s feeding into challenges with engagement on a variety of points, most acutely on humanitarian entry amid a fancy inside safety panorama and intensifying meals safety crises. A extra reactive and transactional Ethiopian method to international coverage additionally has implications for the predictability of regional safety dynamics, in a continued departure from the established sample of 2000-18.
Constructing on twenty years in analysis consulting, and greater than 25 years of subject expertise within the Horn of Africa, Jason has since 2012 undertaken a variety of coverage and tutorial analysis consultancies, targeted on political financial system points throughout the Horn of Africa (primarily Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland and Kenya). With one foot in academia, as managing editor of the Journal of Jap African Research and a Analysis Affiliate on the College of Oxford, and the opposite in coverage, as an Affiliate Senior Researcher on Battle, Safety and Growth at SIPRI, Jason has sought tasks that may allow him to attach tutorial and coverage analysis on problems with relevance to the peoples of Northeast Africa.